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THE TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT AND WINE
FARMERS AT THE CAPE : COLLECT IVE ACT ION ,
RAC IAL DISCOURSE , AND LEGI SLAT IVE
REFORM , C .     –     *
BY PAUL NUGENT
University of Edinburgh
ABSTRACT: This article addresses the struggle between the temperance and wine
interests in South Africa during three phases: –, – and –.
It argues that divergent outcomes were rooted in a combination of diﬀerential
levels of internal cohesion and the conﬁguration of the political arena within which
the protagonists manoeuvred for advantage. Conﬂicting interests within the wine
industry hindered collective action, whereas the temperance movement derived
strength from its decentralized modes of operation and international connections.
The latter pioneered mass action alongside the art of lobbying. After , the wine
industry turned the tables by cementing a special relationship with the National
Party, while tapping into popular nationalism, youth culture, and emergent con-
sumerism.
KEY WORDS: South Africa, alcohol, business, race, politics.
EMBEDDED in the politics of segregation and apartheid, but following a
distinct trajectory, the liquor question was one of the issues that most
animated South African politics in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. It
could reasonably be considered a subset of the ‘race question’, given that it
was whites who sought to manage the intersecting domains of African resi-
dence, work, and leisure – in part through control over the supply of
liquor – and blacks who defended their right to produce and consume on
their own terms. While whites may have worried about the impact of drink
on their capacity to control Africans, the vested interests associated with
alcohol always made prohibition an unlikely prospect. White municipalities
bolstered their revenues through the construction of beerhalls that sold ‘kaﬃr
beer’ manufactured by brewing monopolies. This met temperance concerns
* The research for this article was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Fellowship in .
The project is entitled ‘Race, Taste and Power: The Cape Wine Industry’. Author’s email:
Paul.Nugent@ed.ac.uk
 For key historical appraisals, see C. van Onselen, ‘Randlords and rotgut, –’,
History Workshop, :  (), –; C. Ambler and J. Crush, ‘Alcohol in Southern
African labor history’; J. Baker, ‘Prohibition and illict liquor on the Witwatersand, –
’; P. Bonner, ‘Back to the fence: law, liquor and the search for social control in an East
Rand town, –’; and D. Moodie, ‘Alcohol and resistance on the South African
gold mines’, all in J. Crush and C. Ambler (eds.), Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa
(Athens and Pietermaritzburg, ).
 P. La Hausse, Brewers, Beerhalls and Boycotts: A History of Liquor in South Africa
(Johannesburg, ); and ‘Drink and cultural innovation in Durban: the origins of the
beerhall in South Africa, –’, in Crush and Ambler, Liquor and Labor; I. Evans,
Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa (Berkeley, ), .
Journal of African History,  (), pp. –. © Cambridge University Press  
doi:./S
halfway: black consumers were to be kept away from distilled liquor, and were
encouraged to drink under forms of controlled sociability.
For good reasons, the existing literature on South Africa has concentrated
on the attempt to manage African access to beer, including the product that
the beerhalls dispensed and the bottled beer that came to be associated with
shebeens. In this article, I focus on the products of the vine, namely wine
and brandy, which oﬀer a diﬀerent insight into the politics of consumption.
There are three things to be gained from such a focus. The ﬁrst is that it sheds
fresh light on the debates that circulated around alcohol, and the manner in
which conﬂicting demands were mediated by the state. Although much has
been written about the interests that impinged on state policy after , there
is surprisingly little on alcohol per se. Whereas the breweries had a relatively
weak voice, and depended on consumer resistance to challenge restrictive
legislation, the wine industry combined substantial numbers of farmers in the
Western Cape as well as merchant-manufacturers who bought, bottled and
sold the ﬁnal product across South Africa. Their excise contribution to
central government revenues and their parliamentary representation would be
expected to give them inﬂuence.
Second, the story of wine is one that reveals an especially tangled
relationship between race and consumption. Wine interests faced a greater
challenge than brewers in securing a market for their product, given that very
few blacks drank wine or brandy at the turn of the century. In the short term,
the industry was bound to depend heavily on the Coloured population of the
Western Cape, as well as white consumers who were also heavily concentrated
there. The former were a captive market, but one that was very much
concentrated at the cheap-and-nasty end. The debate about whether
Coloureds were deserving of the same political and social privileges as whites
was refracted through a wine bottle: the question that was repeatedly asked
(from at least the s) was whether the degraded state of the Coloured
population through liquor revealed a ﬂaw that made them inherently
diﬀerent to whites, or whether it merely demonstrated that liquor could
reduce any user to an abject condition. But there was no necessary
correspondence between attitudes to segregation and to temperance. Wine
farmers were generally supportive of segregationism, but clearly had a vested
interest in opening up the market to black consumers. Conversely, the
temperance movement, some of whose members were inclined to reject
segregationism, campaigned to prevent ‘non-whites’ from acquiring access
 On the rise of bottled beer, see A. K. Mager, Beer, Sociability and Masculinity in
South Africa (Bloomington, ). On brewing in rural areas, see H. Bradford, ‘“We
women will show them”: beer protests in the Natal countryside, ’, in Crush and
Ambler, Liquor and Labor; and P. McAllister, Building the Homestead: Agriculture, Labour
and Beer in South Africa’s Transkei (London, ).
 In his class analysis of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, Dan O’Meara pays some
attention to wine producers, but their importance is viewed in terms of their contribution
to capital formation. Neither he nor Deborah Posel is particularly interested in alcohol.
D. O’Meara, Volskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner
Nationalism, – (Cambridge, ), ; D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid,
–: Conﬂict and Compromise (Oxford, ).
 M. Adhikari, Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South
African Coloured Community (Athens, ), , ; fn. .
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to liquor. Each side found ways of rationalising the apparent reversal of
roles.
As for the white population, liquor interests routinely bemoaned the lack of
a genuine wine drinking culture, especially amongst Afrikaners. But those
who fretted about the social eﬀects of alcohol also believed that poor whites
were especially vulnerable to the lure of brandy – and were perhaps in even
more need of protection than blacks who drank a beer that was relatively
harmless and in a social setting. In this way, the discourse about the
relationship between racial integrity and liquor consumption was inverted.
Wine was so contentious, in part because it tended to blur the color lines.
Third, the existing literature on beer has focused on processes that were
particular to South(ern) Africa, including the nexus between town and
countryside, whereas a focus on the vine necessarily places liquor in a broader
international context. South African historiography has remained rather at
the margins of current trends in global and international history, partly
because of its trajectory and sense of its own history. The topic of wine (like
horses) is well-suited to reinserting South Africa back into global history as
something other than a stock exception. The South African temperance
campaign was part of an extremely well-networked movement –what I call
the temperance international –which treated all alcohol as pernicious, but was
especially exercised about distilled liquor. This posed a particular threat to
the wine industry at the Cape, which converted its growing surplus into
brandy. The wine industry countered the temperance argument by insisting
that wine was a natural product: the arguments and the supporting evidence
being derived from other parts of the wine-producing world, notably France.
In this article, I focus primarily upon the struggle between temperance and
wine interests to shape legislative action. I compare the success of the
protagonists during three periods – that is from  to , from  to
, and from  to . Before , the temperance movement held
the upper hand, although it failed to achieve its goal of outright prohibition.
In the second period, the liquor debate became somewhat fragmented,
although temperance remained dominant overall. Finally, in the period after
the victory of the National Party (NP) in , the balance shifted decisively
in favour of the wine lobby. In , the liquor laws were deracialized and
three years later many of the restrictions on the sale of wine were removed, an
outcome that would have been unthinkable in the s. An explanation is
sought in the dynamic interaction between two sets of factors: the
conﬁguration of the political arena in which wine interests and temperance
activism competed for attention; and the level of internal cohesion that
characterized these interest- and issue-based movements respectively. The
temperance movement beneﬁted from being a broad coalition, and may be
 The classic instance was Theophilus Schreiner who defended political rights for all,
but campaigned for prohibition for Africans and Coloureds with special exceptions.
V. Cohen, ‘The public career of Theophilus Lyndall Schreiner: a study of the causes he
espoused’ (unpublished BAHons. long essay in History, University of Cape Town, ).
 ‘Wine and Shebeens in Soweto’,Wynboer (Oct. ).
 An attempt at redressing the balance is I. Berger, South Africa: A World History
(Oxford, ).
 S. Swart, ‘“High horses” – horses, class and socio-economic change in South Africa’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, : (), –.
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credited with having pioneered certain forms of mass action that crossed
color lines. By contrast, the competing interests between wine farmers, and
between farmers and merchants, proved a hindrance to collective action until
the s, when the Koöperatieve Wynbouwers Vereniging van Suid-Afrika
(KWV), which both regulated the industry and represented the farmers,
created a more uniﬁed and eﬀective voice.
F R AM I NG TH E GR E AT E R GOOD : T EM P E R ANC E AND TH E
FA RMER S ,     –    
While the temperance movement was highly internationalized, the wine
farmers were almost parochial. The temperance international was a worthy
successor to the anti-slavery movement of the mid-nineteenth century, and
ﬁts Akira Iriye’s depiction of an emergent ‘global community’ concerned with
the social uplifting of a common humanity. Temperance spawned a dense
network of associations that spanned continents, linking the United States
and Britain with colonies of white settlement, such as Canada, New Zealand,
Australia, and the Cape, and also encompassing India, British West Africa,
South America, and East Asia. The leading organization was the
Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), which had its origins in
the ‘women’s crusade’ in Ohio in , but went global shortly after its
formation. The International Order of Good Templars (IOGT), founded
in the s, was less proliﬁc, but also spread well beyond its origins in the
United States. In the years after the First WorldWar, a renewed international
campaign was launched by the World League Against Alcoholism (WLAA),
which agreed a platform for cooperation with the WCTU.
The IOGT commenced operations at the Cape in , and by the end of
the s it was reputed to have , members, with more than ,
additional members subscribing to the International Order of True Templars
(IOTT), which had been created for a speciﬁcally ‘non-white’membership.
Even more important was the WCTU, whose arrival at the Cape dates from a
visit byMary Leavitt during her world tour in .The ﬁrst aﬃliates were
established there, as well as in Natal and the Orange River Colony that year,
followed by the Transvaal two years later. Following Union in , these
 Surprisingly, Iriye does not mention temperance. A. Iriye, Global Community: The
Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley,
).
 B. Harrison,Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England (London,
), –, –.
 By the s, the WCTU had aﬃliates in more than forty countries. It operated
across the Empire, but also played a signiﬁcant role in Japan. I. R. Tyrrell, Woman’s
World/Woman’s Empire: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in International
Perspective, – (Chapel Hill, ), ; E. D. Lublin, Reforming Japan: The
Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in the Meiji Period (Vancouver, ).
 I. Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton,
), .
 Jennifer Pearce, ‘The origins of the temperance movement in Cape Town in the
s’ (BA Hons. Long Essay, History Department, University of Cape Town), .
 On the signiﬁcance of Leavitt’s tour, see Tyrrell,Woman’s World, .
 Amanda Tiltman, ‘The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union’ (unpublished BA
Hons. dissertation in Economic History, University of Cape Town, ), –.
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chapters merged, although internal distinctions on the basis of color
remained. The South African WCTU kept in close touch with the World
WCTU through literature, visiting speakers, and participation in the regular
cycle of conventions in the USA. It campaigned both for women’s suﬀrage
and against alcohol, which created complex permutations when race was
factored in. The ﬁnal body that deserves mention is the South African
Temperance Alliance (SATA), formed in . SATA positioned itself as
an umbrella body seeking to coordinate the eﬀorts of the IOGT/IOTT,
the WCTU, and a multiplicity of church-based groupings –Methodist,
Anglican, Baptist, and Presbyterian. The relationship between these bodies
was intimate. The leading light in the IOGT, Theophilus Schreiner, was a
vice-president of SATA, who as a member of parliament (MP) counted on
the vocal support of the WCTU. All three bodies attempted to keep their
members abreast of global developments. The list of invited visitors included
William ‘Pussyfoot’ Johnson of the Anti-Saloon League who took time out
from his international campaign on behalf of the WLAA to tour southern
Africa in . Another was Bishop Cannon of the WLAAwho accepted an
invitation from SATA to lend his weight to the campaign for Local Option.
Very few wine farmers had any international experience. Cape farmers
had been involved in global trade in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century,
but the removal of imperial preferences, the devastation wrought by
phylloxera and an unfavourable reputation for quality meant that the export
market dried up in the late-nineteenth century. Farmers introduced new
phylloxera-resistant rootstock from Europe, but they did not replant with
cultivars that permitted a reconstruction of the industry on the basis of export
quality. Moreover, while farmers made several attempts to unite in defence of
their collective interests, the centrifugal forces proved insurmountable. The
topography of the winelands, which are segmented by a chain of steep
mountains north of Paarl, meant that the perspective of many farmers focused
on a particular valley or district. Following the creation of the Afrikaner
Bond in , the interests of the wine farmers found a political outlet. But
party structures were poorly institutionalized and MPs, who tended to be
drawn from an urban elite, conducted themselves with patrician indepen-
dence. The merchant-manufacturers, who bought wine from individual
 Emilie Solomon, who served as president of the Cape WCTU and was national
president from  to , was elected vice-president of theWorldWCTU from  to
. Tyrrell,Woman’s World, .
 In company with Rev. A. J. Cook of SATA, Johnson was alleged to have travelled
,miles and to have addressed , people. National Archives of South Africa, Cape
Town (CA) A/, ‘A Brief History of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union in
South Africa’ (Cape Town, ), ; Tyrrell, Reforming, .
 Tyrrell, Reforming, . Under local option, voters in a locality would receive the
right to vote for a ban on liquor sales.
 They maintained an acquaintance with international events through the Afrikaans
press. On the press and Afrikaner nationalism, see Hermann Giliomee, ‘Western Cape
wine farmers and the beginnings of Afrikaner nationalism, –’, Journal of
Southern African Studies, : (), –.
 In , a Wine Farmers Association had been established to oppose an excise tax on
brandy, but it did not endure.
 J. L. McCracken, The Cape Parliament, – (Oxford, ), –, –.
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farmers, and blended and bottled it, were almost entirely dependent upon the
South African market. As dedicated urbanites, who owned hotels and liquor
outlets in Cape Town, they had little empathy with the farmers from whom
they purchased, typically bemoaning the deplorable quality.
While the temperance leadership tended to be urban, female, and English-
speaking, the wine farmers comprised Afrikaner men who mostly adhered
to the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). SATA purported to embrace
an ecumenical vision – seeking to enlist both eminent Muslims and Jews
in the cause. But while SATA listed Dr Abdullah Abdurahman as one
of its vice-presidents, it was patently a vehicle for English-speaking
Protestants. Although a solid body of the DRC was opposed to alcohol,
there was a lingering sensitivity about Anglophone domination of the
movement. Moreover, the fact that WCTU campaigned for a qualiﬁed, but
non-racial and gender-equal franchise, was not likely to endear it to many
farmers. But by far the greatest source of distemper was the campaign
against the dop stelsel or tot system. Since the days of slavery, farmers had
provided rations of alcohol to their slaves at intervals over the working day.
After the ending of slavery, the practice was deemed essential for the
recruitment of farm workers in the context of endemic labour shortages.
Defending themselves against the charge that they encouraged alcohol
dependency, the farmers maintained that they had always exercised a moral
responsibility for the welfare of their Coloured wards, which included
regulating access to liquor.
Around the turn of the century, the relationship between the temperance
movement and the farmers was highly fractious. As a glut of cheap wine
translated into ruinously low prices, the farmers were sensitive to anything
that might further restrict the internal market. In the context of mounting
complaints about public drunkenness in Cape Town, temperance activists
sought to persuade the authorities to introduce stricter controls. Their
campaigns bore fruit in the Liquor Act of  that included prison sentences
for repeat convictions and the introduction of Local Option provisions. The
law required that applications for new licences be supported by a majority of
voters from the relevant district council, and that licensing courts reject
applications for renewal where two-thirds of voters in a district, municipality,
or ward objected. In an amendment of , licensing courts were
empowered to impose additional conditions on the sale of liquor to ‘natives’,
 On Abdurahman, see V. Bickford-Smith, Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in
Victorian Cape Town: Group Identity and Social Practice, – (Cambridge, ),
, .
 J. McKinnon, ‘Women’s Christian Temperance Union: aspects of early feminism in
the Cape,  to ’ (unpublished MA thesis, UNISA, ), chap. .
 P. Scully, ‘Liquor and Labor in theWestern Cape, –’, in Crush and Ambler
(eds.), Liquor and Labor.
 On the ambiguities surrounding emancipation, see P. Scully, Liberating the Family?
Gender and British Slave Emancipation in the Rural Western Cape, South Africa, –
 (Oxford, ); and W. Dooling, Slavery, Emancipation and Colonial Rule in South
Africa (Scottsville, ).  Pearce ‘Origins’, .
 Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors (Act  of ),
published in P. T. Jones (ed.), The Liquor Laws of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope
With Notes of Cases Decided Thereon (Cape Town, ), –.
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while fresh restrictions were placed on the brewing of ‘kaﬃr beer’ in the rural
areas. Throughout, temperance activists instigated mass petitions and
lobbied MPs. Indeed, the movement can be credited with transforming
politics into the legitimate concern of a wider populace, most of which was
formally excluded from the franchise.
In , SATA drew up a joint programme with eleven action points,
which can be collapsed into four. The ﬁrst, and most crucial, was to apply
pressure upon the Cape government to introduce a consolidated liquor law
that would bring about ‘the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquor to the
native races’ and to ban sales to whites at theatres, music halls, and circuses.
The second was to exploit the provisions of existing legislation, by attending
licensing courts en masse and challenging the rubber-stamping of applications.
The third was the furtherance of public education, including temperance
teaching in schools. The ﬁnal aspect consisted of promoting ‘counter-
attractions’ to the canteen.TheWCTU sponsored tea-rooms, coﬀee houses,
and outlets for the sale of fruit juices. The only concession to the embattled
wine farmers was the contention that grapes could be used to produce healthy
alternatives such as cordials, juices, and moskonfyt (grape-must jams).
This renewed activism coincided with lobbying by distressed wine
farmers and merchants for government assistance. In , a Colonial
Wine-Farmers andWineMerchant Association was formed. Its chairman was
C.W.H. Kohler, a farmer fromDrakenstein who had only recently left active
party politics. C. F. Sedgwick, one of the principal wine merchants, was vice-
chairman, underlining the extent to which the Depression was hurting
farmers and merchants alike. The temperance campaign had managed to
gradually reduce the supply of liquor over the previous decade; the wine
lobby now attempted to reverse the situation. The association demanded a
revision of laws inhibiting wine sales and the appointment of a select
committee to enquire into the state of the industry. The following year, a
private Light Wines Bill was brought to parliament. This was designed to
assist the farmers by lengthening the hours of sale and permitting them to sell
wine from the farm-gate. The temperance movement mobilized all its
resources to assist Schreiner in ﬁghting the bill. The WCTU had previously
enjoyed some success with written petitions, but now decided to embark
on more direct action. Having collected signatures under its ‘Women’s
 Temperance Campaign’, the WCTU marched on parliament where
its leaders presented a petition, sparking an impromptu debate amongst
 The ﬁnal Act deﬁned a ‘native’ as ‘any Kaﬁr, Fingo, Basuto, Damara, Hottentot,
Bushman or Koranna’. See Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Sale of Liquor (Act No.
 of ), article , in Jones, Liquor Laws, .
 The WCTU submitted  petitions in support of the  Act. McKinnon,
‘Women’s Christian’, . White women did not acquire the full franchise until the
Women’s Enfranchisement Act of . A relatively small number of Coloured and
African men who met the qualiﬁcations could vote.
 The expression is borrowed from Harrison in relation to the pub. Drink and the
Victorians, –.
 A. Joelson (ed.), TheMemoirs of Kohler of the K.W. V.: Politician, Traveller, Founder
of the South African Wine Industry (London, ), .
 The Liquor Laws Licensing Act of  had permitted the sale of light wines from
grocery stores. McKinnon, ‘Women’s Christian’, .
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MPs about whether their actions underlined or undermined the case for
the women’s franchise. The unprecedented demonstration stung the
wine farmers into mounting their own ‘anti-temperance crusade’ in
Wellington.
This was a rare occasion on which the farmers prevailed. The ﬁnal iteration
of the act permitted farmers and cooperatives to sell wine in volumes of not
less than four gallons without a licence. Moreover, such sales could be made
to Africans who were registered voters, as well as to Coloureds. The sequel
was that parliament commissioned a British wine expert, Lord Blyth, to
investigate both the temperance claim that Cape ‘light wines’ were actually
high in alcohol, and the problems that were holding the industry back.
Blyth’s opinion was that Cape wines were indeed highly alcoholic, but the
thrust of his report was far from comforting to the temperance cause. Blyth
maintained that French success was built on nurturing an internal market for
wine and that France provided clear evidence for the health beneﬁts of wine
even at over a hundred of bottles per head per year.
In , John X. Merriman became prime minister in alliance with the
Afrikaner Bond. Although a wine farmer, Merriman was critical of the
tendency of most producers to place volume ahead of quality. Moreover, he
was unyielding over the demand that the government remove the excise tax on
wine. On  April , Kohler led a demonstration of some , farmers
onto the streets of Cape Town, culminating in a mass meeting in City Hall.
The farmers demanded an audience with Merriman, which he granted only
grudgingly. In heated exchanges, Kohler was scathing about Merriman’s
refusal to make a ﬁrm commitment to assisting the farmers, and insisted that
the underlying problem was not over-production, but excessive regulation: ‘If
the same quantity of wine cannot be consumed to-day, it is clearly due to
legislative enactments which have so restricted the dealings in your product
that the consumption is less to-day than it was twenty-ﬁve years ago.’ The
latter was an obvious allusion to the temperance campaign. In October ,
the WCTU responded with a further march through Cape Town to express
opposition to any dilution of the liquor laws.
Following this ill-tempered debate, the negotiations leading to Union
brought about a temporary suspension of hostilities. Both sides needed some
 Schreiner argued that this action provided the ﬁtness of women to receive the vote.
McKinnon, ‘Women’s Christian’, –.
 ‘The wine farmers: anti-temperance crusade’, Cape Argus,  Sept. .
 Act to Provide for the Sale Without a Licence of Certain Liquors Made by Persons
Engaged in Viticulture on their Own Property (Act No.  of ) article , in Jones,
Liquor Laws, .  McKinnon, ‘Women’s Christian’, .
 CA AGR  C. ‘Cape Wine Commission and Lord Blyth’s report on Cape Wine
Industry’ ().
 The Bond had historically drawn support from the wine farmers. Giliomee, ‘Western
Cape’, –.
 Although McKinnon rightly observes that Merriman rejected the right of women to
petition in chauvinistic terms, her claim that he treated the farmers preferentially is
questionable. ‘Women’s Christian’, –.
 The ﬁgure is cited in D. J. Van Zyl, KWV  Jaar (Paarl, ), .
 ‘Wine farmer’s demonstration: a great gathering’, Cape Times,  Apr. .
 This quote from the South African News is reproduced in Joelson,Memoirs, .
 McKinnon, ‘Women’s Christian’, .
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time to adjust to the enlargement of the political arena. The temperance
movement had the most to gain – certainly Schreiner believed so – because it
became that bit easier to coordinate campaign strategies. However, whereas
English-speakers had dominated the Cape legislature, the Union parliament
was certain to be controlled by Afrikaners. Hence the WCTU/SATA
needed to ﬁnd a way of making a common cause rather than presuming to
speak for them. This did not come naturally, as is reﬂected in the tardiness
with which the WCTU adjusted to publication in Afrikaans. As for the
wine farmers, their MPs now represented a relatively small group within
parliament, who could not necessarily count on government backing when
other interests were competing for attention.
After , much of the eﬀort of the WCTU was directed towards oﬀering
alternatives to alcohol for servicemen and policing the extension of liquor
licences. Moreover, campaigners continued to draw attention to liquor
abuse amongst the Cape Coloured population. This culminated in the
creation of the (Baxter) Select Committee in , at which Schreiner made a
plea for bringing Coloureds under the restrictive provisions of the  Act,
with an exemption for ‘respectable’ elements. Schreiner also attempted to
pass a Direct Vote Bill that would have extended Local Option by
transferring powers from licensing courts to communities. As for the
farmers, the lack of any functioning association impeded eﬀorts to change the
law. In , Tielman Roos endeavoured to pass a bill permitting Africans
freer access to ‘kaﬃr beer’ and light wines, allowing coﬀee shops and boarding
houses to apply for licences, and extending the hours of sale. The failure of
this bill signalled a turning point because it led farmers’ leaders to shift the
emphasis away from an expansion of the market for wine towards seeking
higher prices. This reduced some of the points of friction with the temperance
lobby, while bringing latent tensions with the merchants to the fore.
Temperance campaigners and wine farmers used very similar rhetoric
when attacking what they regarded as noxious monopolies in the liquor trade.
The former complained of an excess of canteens dispensing cheap (andmostly
fortiﬁed) wine, coupled with a tendency on the part of liquor ﬁrms to cultivate
tied-houses. The WCTU and SATA alleged that licensing courts deferred to
vested interests and were rife with corruption. As for the farmers, a common
complaint was that the merchants acquired wine at the lowest possible prices
at the end of the season and sold it on to consumers at a premium. For
temperance activists, wine was too cheaply available, while for farmers the
price to the consumer was unjustiﬁably high. But both agreed that it was
merchants who elevated proﬁt above the greater good.
The war years brought renewed diﬃculties for farmers, as prices
plummeted to between £. to £ per leaguer between  and , by
 In , English-speakers still made up  per cent of MPs. McCracken, Cape
Parliament, table , .
 Very little temperance material was translated into Afrikaans before the War. Ruby
Adendorﬀ, one of the leaders of the WCTU, eventually published Alkohol –Wat Dit is en
Wat Dit Doen (Paarl, ).  McKinnon, ‘Women’s Christian’, –.
 The committee’s oﬃcial title was the Select Committee on Drunkenness in the
Western Districts of the Cape Province. Cohen, ‘Public career’, . The Baxter report
recommended regulation of the dop.  Cohen, ‘Public career’, .
 McKinnon, ‘Women’s Christian’, .  Joelson,Memoirs, .
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT AND WINE FARMERS
comparison with prices of £ to £ a decade earlier. Kohler urged the
formation of a cooperative society that could collectively negotiate with the
merchants. After one stalled attempt, the details were hammered out in ,
and the following year the KWV was formally registered – initially as a
company (as there was no system for registering cooperatives) and then as a
cooperative in . Boasting a membership of , farmers by April ,
the KWVwas able to present itself as a serious player. In his memoirs, Kohler
claimed that the merchants had been obstructive and had only been brought
to the bargaining table by the threat of entering into distillation. Attacking
the sharp practices of the liquor ﬁrms –much like targeting the mining
companies –was guaranteed to secure a sympathetic audience. But in fact,
the ﬁrms were not averse to dealing with a single farmers’ association. In
November , the Board of Sedgwick passed a resolution approving the
principle of ﬁxing a ‘reasonable minimum price’, for disposing of the surplus,
and for taking measures to prevent the sale of wine below the agreed price.
In addition, the ﬁrm decided not to enter into any fresh contracts with
farmers pending the inauguration of the KWV. Furthermore, a number of the
leading merchants (including Sedgwick) agreed to seek an arrangement with
the KWV provided the latter could secure control over at least  per cent of
total production, and the ﬁrms of E. K. Green and H. C. Collison’s came on
board.
In the ﬁrst year, the merchants agreed to pay a minimum price of £. s
for distilling wine and £. s for ‘good’ (drinking) wine. The KWV passed
this on to the farmers, less  s on each leaguer and a pro rata deduction
for wine that was estimated to be surplus to the requirements of the trade.
Under a so-called ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, the KWV consented not to
dispose of surpluses in competition with the ﬁrms south of the equator,
including South Africa. However, in , responding to rumours of a short
vintage, W. C. Winshaw secretly signed contracts with as many farmers as
possible, in eﬀect undercutting the arrangement between the KWV and the
larger ﬁrms. Winshaw announced that he controlled  per cent of the crop
and invited the merchants to join him in a combine. The latter spurned the
oﬀer and some, like the Castle Wine and Brandy Co. (CWBC), competed,
pushing prices to a level where farmers began turning every kind of grape into
cheap wine. The anticipated shortfall was transformed overnight into a
veritable glut, and prices plummeted. A number of ﬁrms were bankrupted,
including Winshaw, while others were bought out by rivals who weathered
 One leaguer is the equivalent of  litres. Union of South Africa, Report of the Wine
Commission (Pretoria, ) [U/G. No , ], ; Van Zyl, KWV, .
 He made an exception of Mr Jooste of Jooste & Bryant who even made a loan to the
KWV. Joelson,Memoirs, .
 Boonzaier’s cartoon image of Hoggenheimer, representing a ﬁctitious Jewish mining
magnate, became a regular feature in Die Burger. H. Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography
of a People (London, ), . The over-representation of Jews in the trade did not go
unnoticed.
 Distell Archive, Stellenbosch, South Africa (DA), ‘The House of Sedgwick’
(unpublished typescript, ), .  Ibid. .
 The major players signed up, notably E. K. Green, CWBC, Collison’s, Sedgwick
and Co., and the Van Ryn Wine and Brandy Co. Van Zyl, KWV, .
 The Wine Commission cites a ﬁgure of £ per leaguer. Wine Commission, .
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the storm. This shakeout formed part of a long-range pattern of concen-
tration in the industry. By , the wholesale trade was divided up
between three players: CWBC/E. K. Green at · per cent, Sedgwick/Jooste
& Bryant at · per cent, and Santhagens (plus  small ﬁrms) holding the
remaining  per cent.
T EM P E R ANC E AND S TA S I S ,     –  
In the early s, the triumph of prohibition in the United States brought
liquor back to the forefront of public debate in South Africa. Although few
imagined that the country would suddenly ‘go dry’, the temperance move-
ment pursued modiﬁed Local Option as an interim measure. Although their
campaign posed a threat to the wine farmers, the KWV was too preoccupied
with its own survival to engage with the debate.
In the early s, the temperance movement could point to evidence that
it was winning over Afrikaner opinion. In  the Synod of the Cape DRC
had ﬁnally taken a stand against the dop, although it advocated regulation
rather than abolition. In parliament, the movement also found an eﬀective
champion in DrD. F.Malan, a theologian whose father actually owned a wine
farm –which was inherited by his brother and fellow-politician S. F.Malan.
However, his Local Option Bill was opposed by manyMPs as a slippery slope
to prohibition and was narrowly defeated, as it was the following year. These
near-misses underlined the importance of mobilizing public support to per-
suade waveringMPs to back legislation. At the end of , the parliamentary
campaign spilled over into a very public spat between the temperance
movement and its opponents. On –December, SATA convened a congress
in Cradock where Rev. A. J. Cook rather optimistically pronounced that
South Africa ‘had caught the spirit of the age’ and was destined to become a
global leader in the temperance cause. A number of papers were read invok-
ing international opinion supporting social, health, and theological reasons
why liquor was a scourge. The WCTU president, Emilie Solomon, spoke on
the eﬀects of alcohol on the home and on infant mortality, and ﬁnished on a
remarkable ﬂourish concerning the eﬀects upon racial vitality.The congress
concluded by passing a number of resolutions, one of which advocated better
links with the DRC while another proposed sending a letter to farmers’
leaders urging cooperation around the production of non-alcoholic bev-
erages.
 The CWBC acquired Collison’s, while Jooste & Bryant from Johannesburg acquired
Sedgwick. DA, ‘House of Sedgwick’, .
 M. Fridjohn and A. Murray, Conspiracy of Giants: The South African Liquor
Industry (Johannesburg, ).  Wine Commission, .
 Union of South Africa, Report of the Cape Coloured Commission of Enquiry [U.G. /
], .
 Interview with Danie Malan, Allesverloren, Riebeeck-Kasteel,  Nov. . S. F.
Malan became a longstanding KWV director.
 Rev. A. J. Cook, ‘The American experiment and its meaning for South Africa’, in
The Drink Problem in South Africa: Addresses and Papers Delivered at the Local Option
Congress Held at Cradock on December th and th,  (Cape Town, ), .
 Miss E. Solomon, ‘Alcohol and the home’, in ibid. .
 Resolutions in ibid. .
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The Cradock congress galvanized the defenders of wine into holding a
counter-meeting in Paarl in May . The formal agenda was to promote
temperance, and Professor A. I. Perold from Stellenbosch University – South
Africa’s pre-eminent viticultural expert – used this theme to argue for the
beneﬁts of moderate consumption. He attacked Local Option as the thin end
of the wedge:
Some opponents of drunkenness believe that the principle of moderation is not
suﬃciently eﬀective to ﬁght the abuse of liquor successfully; and therefore they
plead for total prohibition, as it is now generally called. Their favourite means to
this end is the ﬁne-sounding term ‘local option’ which aims at the local total
prohibition of the sale of liquor in order to make the whole country gradually dryer
and dryer, until as a whole, it will be ripe for total prohibition. Everyone who is
against total prohibition should therefore also oppose this local option, the more so
as its supporters, as recently happened at the Cradock conference, no longer hide
the fact that their ﬁnal goal is prohibition.
W.C. Winshaw, who had previously worked with SATA to manufacture
grape juice and moskonfyt, was the most vociferous of all. As an American, he
presented an awful spectre of South Africa being turned into ‘a nursery of
fanatics . . . with perhaps two and a half hypocrites to a family – one awful vast
Kansas’. Louis Leipoldt, a respected Afrikaner intellectual with a medical
background, inserted a new line of argument that was later to be fully
elaborated. He maintained that alcohol was an inherent part of human
physiology and hence was the opposite of a ‘poison’. Like Perold, he insisted
that moderate consumption – especially light wines –was an aid to digestion
and contained vital nutrients.
Meanwhile, the KWV was ﬁghting for its survival. Following the crisis of
, the declared surplus increased to as much as two thirds of production.
While the merchants were paying £ a leaguer to the KWV, the farmers only
received £ and had to surrender their surpluses for destruction, which
produced some restiveness. The moment of reckoning came when the ﬁrms
announced their intention to withdraw from the price agreement at the end of
. KWV directors realized that the game might be up unless they could
secure legislation that would compel the merchants to comply while
preventing free-riding by farmers. Charlie Heatlie, KWV director and
South African Party (SAP) MP for Worcester approached Jan Smuts, the
prime minister, with a proposal for devolving regulatory powers to the
KWV. Smuts signalled that he was amenable provided such a step enjoyed
the support of the majority of members and the NP did not turn it into a
partisan aﬀair. After leading ﬁgures within the KWV brokered discussions
between SAP and NP politicians, Smuts agreed to personally bring a bill to
parliament at the earliest opportunity. During the subsequent debate, the
 Perold moved to the KWV in . R. U. Kenney, Abraham Izak Perold: Wegwyser
van ons Wingerdbou (Cape Town, ).
 A. I. Perold, ‘The social aspect of the liquor problem’, inWine and Drunkenness: The
Social Problem of the Day (Cape Town, ), .
 W.C.Winshaw, ‘The eﬀect of prohibition in America’, inWine and Drunkenness, .
 Dr C. Louis Leipoldt, ‘The medical aspect of the moderate consumption of alcohol’,
in ibid. –.  Van Zyl, KWV, .  Ibid. –.
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Wine and Spirits Control Bill was vigorously attacked by MPs from both
sides of the house. Smuts conceded that the farmers had been their own worst
enemy by producing masses of wine ‘only ﬁt for the gutter’ and conceded that
many criticisms of the KWVwere justiﬁed. But he insisted that it was better
to support the industry in putting its house in order rather than imposing
state control.
Smuts received support from some MPs representing wine farming
constituencies, but others expressed scepticism about the capacity of the
KWV to deliver. The MP for Constantia accused the KWV of pandering to
poorer farmers by paying high prices for ‘absolute muck’, while the makers of
good wine were oﬀered a price that did not reﬂect their much lower yields.
Another MP similarly observed that there was a clear division between the
historic winelands and the irrigated districts to the north where farmers ‘can
simply let the wine ﬂow’. D. F. Malan was conspicuously silent, and the
only temperance MP who spoke actually supported the Bill on the grounds
that a stronger farmers’ association might be able to steer the industry in the
direction of raisins and motor fuel. Possibly, temperance MPs did not wish
to alienate colleagues whose votes would be crucial to the passage of the latest
iteration of the Local Option Bill that Leslie Blackwell introduced in
February . Smuts carried the day, although opponents succeeded in
limiting KWV regulation to distilling wine and the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’
was reconﬁrmed. By contrast, Blackwell’s bill failed by a margin of two votes.
His mistake was to express the hope that Local Option would lead eventually
to outright prohibition. Roos was emphatic that winelands MPs could hardly
vote for the bill, adding that it was especially anachronistic given that Smuts
had only just introduced legislation to assist the farmers.
When parliament reconvened after the  election, it was an alliance
between the National and Labour Parties that commanded the majority.
Within the Pact Government, Roos assumed the Justice portfolio. In , a
Local Option Bill was introduced for the fourth year in succession, but failed
by a wider margin. It now fell to Roos to formulate legislation that would
consolidate the liquor laws. Introducing his Liquor Bill in September ,
Roos unwisely pinned his anti-temperance colors to the mast by openly
criticizing ‘self-appointed reformers’. The bill conceded something to both
wine interests and the temperance lobby, but at the risk of alienating both. On
the one hand, Roos proposed an extension of the dop system to the Transvaal,
on the basis that outright prohibition for Africans had proved a singular
 Jan Smuts moving second reading of the Wine and Spirits Control Bill, Assembly
Debates,  Feb. , column .
 Bisset (MP for South Peninsula), Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of
Assembly (Pretoria),  Feb. , column .
 Le Roux van Niekerk (MP for Waterberg), Debates,  Feb. , column .
 Nathan (MP for Von Brandis), Debates,  Mar. , column .
 W.H. Stuart (MP for Tembuland), Debates,  Feb. , column . Will Stuart
was the only son of Katie Stuart, who was active in the IOGT and SATA, following in the
footsteps of her uncle Theophilus Schreiner. I am grateful to Liz Stanley for clariﬁcation.
 Tielman Roos (MP for Lichtenburg), Debates,  Feb. , column .
 Tielman Roos (Minister of Justice), introducing second reading of Liquor Bill,
Debates,  Feb. , column .
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT AND WINE FARMERS
failure and that it would help to stem the drift of labour to the cities. In
addition, his bill envisaged government canteens through which liquor could
be made available to ‘non-whites’ under controlled conditions. Part of the
intention was to expand the market for light wines, which Roos considered a
desirable outcome. The bill omitted a Local Option clause and went further
by excluding teetotallers from serving on licensing boards. Finally, whites
were to be permitted to purchase wine and beer from cafés and restaurants
without complicated licensing restrictions. On the other hand, the bill
intended to phase out licences for stand-up canteens over a ﬁve-year period.
The bill would have permitted Coloureds in the Cape to drink in licensed
canteens, but banned them from purchasing oﬀ-sales. Crucially, Africans at
the Cape were to forfeit the right to consume any ‘European alcohol’,
regardless of whether they were on the voters’ register.
Roos had already pre-empted debate by announcing that the bill would be
referred to a select committee. Over the next two years, the WCTU and
SATA kept up sustained pressure through petitions and public meetings,
targeting aspects of the ‘Roos Bill’ that they regarded as unacceptable. The
document that returned to parliament in  was shorn of its provisions
for freer access. At a ‘mass meeting’ at City Hall, which was led by the
archbishop of Cape Town, temperance speakers celebrated the withdrawal of
‘two-thirds’ of the oﬀending articles from the bill. While SATA fought on,
the KWV made almost no impact. Of the wine-farming MPs, Heatlie and
J. H.H. De Waal made lengthy contributions to the debate, but given the
latter’s hostility to the KWV they struggled to ﬁnd a uniﬁed voice. They did
mount a spirited defence of the dop, but this was more about justifying
established practice in the Cape than supporting an extension to the north.
In , the temperance movement claimed victory. Under the Liquor
Act, all Africans were now excluded from the purchase of wine, beer, and
spirits. This represented a signiﬁcant change in the Cape – although permits
of exemption could be applied for in exceptional circumstances. For
temperance campaigners, there were only three lingering sources of regret.
The ﬁrst was that they had failed to prevent the legalization of municipal
beerhalls on the Witwatersrand. Second, the dop system remained in place in
the Cape and the Orange Free State, albeit subject to formal regulation, while
Coloureds in the Cape were permitted to purchase alcohol from canteens and
oﬀ-licences. Third, they had failed to revive Local Option. But the hours of
sale had been reduced, while the wine farmer’s licence was restricted to large
volumes consumed oﬀ-premises. Blackwell and the temperance lobby had
forced Roos into a humiliating retreat through a skilful mixture of public
campaigning – including public meetings and letters to the press – and the
application of direct pressure to MPs. The wine farmers had been out-
manoeuvred.
The  debate was played out against the backdrop of a segregationist
agenda set out by the Pact government. While WCTU campaigning against
prostitution would suggest that the movement had always been committed to
entrenching racial boundaries, things had never been clear-cut when it came
 The exemptions covered a period of  months. Act to Consolidate and Amend the
Laws for the Control of the Supply of Intoxicating Liquor (Liquor Act) (No.  of ),
section  ().
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to temperance. The movement had often spoken for Africans, but SATA
had also encouraged African temperance advocates to articulate their own
concerns as citizens – and as men. Given that white women did not enjoy the
right to vote until , the WCTU had it own reasons for being wary of
paternalism. But, as Pamela Scully argues, the women’s franchise campaign
was constructed ‘as a white narrative’ in which black voters were marginal to
the story and black women were all but forgotten. By the s, the
temperance movement had adopted the line of least resistance: from regarding
‘respectable’ Africans as valuable allies, white campaigners accepted that
removing the African right to consume liquor might be coupled with the loss
of voting rights in the Cape. The established association between these rights
could therefore cut both ways. If gender trumped race at the expense of black
voting rights, temperance imperatives subsequently undermined the case
for a common citizenship. In the case of the Coloured population, however,
there was greater resistance to the segregationist position. As Jeremy Martens
has noted, many MPs defended Coloured rights to consumption on the basis
of non-racialism and the observation that they were every bit as sober and
respectable as whites. With respect to the franchise, some Afrikaner
nationalists, most notably Hertzog, argued that Coloureds should be
embraced. Crucially, however, those who demurred pointed to alcoholism
as the critical defect proving that Coloureds were not ﬁt to be partners in the
political arena. The liquor and segregationist debates were closely inter-
twined.
The  debate had gone badly for the wine farmers. To compound
matters, production more than doubled from , leaguers in  to
, leaguers ten years later. The largest increases were recorded in the
irrigable districts of Worcester, Montagu, and Robertson, which accounted
for · per cent of total production in . Given that this additional
output consisted almost entirely of distilling wine, the warnings of the
Constantia MP in  proved prescient. However, in the decade after ,
debates about excessive liquor consumption and the overproduction of wine
took place in distinct fora –which made a revisitation of the Liquor Act
unlikely in the medium term.
This bifurcation of the liquor question is apparent from two enquiries that
reported in , the ﬁrst of which was the Cape Coloured Commission.
 K. Shear, ‘“Not welfare or uplift work”: white women, masculinity and policing in
South Africa’, Gender and History, : (), –.
 P. Scully, ‘White maternity and black infancy: the rhetoric of race in the South
African women’s suﬀrage movement, –’, in I. C. Fletcher, P. Levine and L. R.N
Mayhall (eds.), Women’s Suﬀrage in the British Empire: Citizenship, Nation and Race
(London, ), .  Scully, ‘White maternity’, .
 J. C. Martens, ‘Conﬂicting views of “Coloured” people in the South African Liquor
Bill debate of ’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, :  (), –. Major
G. B. Van Zyl referred to a petition signed by , Coloured people, many of whom
were temperance supporters, objecting to any distinction on the basis of color. Van Zyl
(MP for Harbour), Debates,  Feb. , column –.
 Cape Africans lost the qualiﬁed franchise in , while Coloureds were taken oﬀ the
common voters roll in .  Wine Commission, Table II, .
 Union of South Africa, Commission of Enquiry Regarding Cape Coloured Population
on the Union ().
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Although alcohol comprised only a small part of its remit, it was informed by
the debate about whether the lack of social cohesion was due to some
biological deﬁcit, poverty or the destructive consequences of drink. The six-
member commission included Dr Abdurahman who had long been associated
with temperance. The commissioners came to the conclusion that while
Cape Malays (as Muslims) did not drink and that the artisanal classes were
generally moderate in their consumption, many of the ‘unskilled labouring
type’ were experiencing a reduction of their wage-earning capacity as a
consequence of their ‘physical and moral deterioration’. The commission was
sceptical that abolishing the dop would resolve the problem, but nevertheless
recommended it as part of a coordinated push to improve rural living
conditions. Its pragmatism was also reﬂected in the balance struck between
opposition to prohibition for Coloureds, which it considered un-enforceable,
and advocacy of an end to bulk sales for oﬀ-site consumption and a tightening
up of the hours of sale. In eﬀect, the commission accepted some temperance
arguments, whilst borrowing from critics who maintained that ill-chosen
legislative intervention was doomed to failure. Reﬂecting the inﬂuence of
Abdurahman, the commission rejected a racial reading of alcohol addiction
and placed its faith in the leadership of ‘the upper Coloured classes’ in
fostering a social stigma towards intemperance amongst the ‘lower classes’.
This defence of Coloured social cohesion also represented a coded rebuttal of
segregationism and should be read in the context of the disenfranchisement of
Cape Africans the previous year.
The second enquiry was the Wine Commission, which produced the most
detailed report on the industry in the twentieth century. The enquiry was
necessitated by the failure of the KWV either to curb production or to
establish enough of an export market to dispose of the surplus. The KWV
directors sought to persuade the commission that the association could
eﬀectively regulate production and pursue quality, but only if it was given
complete regulatory powers over both distilling and good wine. The KWV
placed much of the blame at the doorstep of the liquor ﬁrms that had an
interest in dividing the farmers. By stark contrast, the ﬁrms opposed
anything that would confer greater regulatory powers on the KWV, whereas
the quality wine farmers repeated the complaint that the KWVwas hostage to
mass producers. Some witnesses sought to revisit the Liquor Act by arguing
that the market for wine was artiﬁcially constrained by the ban on the sale of
light wines to ‘natives’. Although the commission declared this beyond its
competence, it could not resist commenting on evidence that Africans were,
in fact, acquiring access to drink and opined that it made better sense ‘to see
that facilities are provided for the supply of liquor, of moderate alcoholic
 Red die Kleurling Volk! (Cape Town, ), .
 Its members included Sidney Waterson who was an MP and a member of the Board
of Sedgwick. DA, ‘House of Sedgwick’, . It also included Alfred Appleyard, the
manager of Rhodes Fruit Farms.
 Kohler recalled that in  the wine merchants had circulated pamphlets at a
gathering of farmers in Worcester, which had been called to consider the proposals for
regulation, in an eﬀort to encourage members to break ranks. Unie Van Suid-Afrika,
Verslag Van die Gekose Komitee oor die Kontrole oor Wyn en Spiritualeë
Wysigingswetsontwerp (Cape Town, ), .
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strength, to natives in reasonable quantities under adequate supervision and
decent surroundings.’ These observations chipped away at the assumptions
underpinning the Liquor Act.
In addition, the commission criticized other aspects of the legislation that
were considered ‘unnecessarily irksome’. It proposed that the prohibition
on the sale of wine through cafés and restaurants be repealed and that special
licences be provided that would be exempt from quotas imposed under the
Liquor Act. It further recommended that the KWV and the merchants join
forces in a publicity campaign to promote the drinking of light wines.
Anticipating a horriﬁed temperance response, the commission observed that
‘the supply of natural dry wines, of low alcoholic strength in limited
quantities with meals only’ would educate ‘young people in the proper use of
alcoholic liquor’. Although its observations received less publicity than the
recommendation that regulatory powers over all wine be placed in the hands
of the KWV, the commission interpolated a discourse about healthy lifestyles
into the liquor debate.
Temperance organizations played no part in the proceedings of the Wine
Commission and do not seem to have reacted to its ﬁndings. Although they
continued to push for prohibition for ‘non-whites’, changing demographic
realities began to reconﬁgure the debate in the Cape. The issue had hitherto
been excessive consumption by Coloureds, but a SATA pamphlet reﬂects a
growing awareness of fresh challenges arising from the growing African
population of the Western Cape.This theme resonated strongly in the Cape
Coloured Liquor Commission, whose report was published in . In
many ways, it merely rehashed the Cape Coloured Commission in a less
nuanced fashion, falling back on crude notions of innate biological disposi-
tions derived from ‘Hottentot blood’. The commission made two speciﬁc
claims, one tendentious and the other more ﬁrmly grounded. The ﬁrst was
that Coloureds had become ‘so enfeebled’ through drink that they were no
longer capable of performing heavy farm work, thereby opening the door to
African labour. The second was that because Africans could not legally
acquire access to ‘kaﬃr beer’ in the Western Cape, they were tempted to
purchase wine and brandy illegally with the assistance of Coloured middle-
men. Having drawn attention to the burgeoning illicit trade, the commis-
sion did not advocate an immediate change to the law. But it did recommend
that government consider the ‘native’ liquor question in the Western Cape at
the same time as it dealt with Coloured consumption.
T H E B R E AKTHROUGH O F W I N E I N T E R E S T S ,     –  
In the decade that followed, the relatively stable balance between wine and
temperance interests was disrupted. The ﬁrst reason is that the manner in
which interests were articulated was transformed by the victory of the NP in
. The WCTU and SATA had pioneered the art of mass action and
 Wine Commission, .  Ibid. .
 Ibid. .  Red die Kleurling Volk, .
 Report of the Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry.  Ibid. .
 Ibid. .
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political lobbying. These strategies were eﬀective at a time when there was
relative parity between the parties and when MPs had to worry about the size
of their majorities. But as the NP cemented its electoral grip, MPs became less
susceptible to such pressure. There was a preference in the NP for inter-
nalizing debate and reaching a consensus behind closed doors, and those who
sought to lobby government needed to ﬁnd ways of penetrating the inner
sanctums of the party, especially at the provincial level. Moreover, successive
administrations were preoccupied with the elaboration of apartheid doctrine
and practice during the s. To some extent, evasion of the liquor laws
could be addressed within the context of apartheid regulation –most notably
through the Group Areas Act () that aimed to erase zones of interracial
contact. But police reports made it abundantly clear that this alone was
insuﬃcient.
A second reason was that the temperance movement lost much of its
internal cohesion. Once white women had acquired the vote, the ability of
campaigners to creatively couple and delink the franchise and temperance
lapsed: it is striking that the temperance movement scored its greatest hits
before white women’s enfranchisement. The movement had relinquished its
potentially important African support base well before . Thereafter,
defending prohibition for Africans was in tune with the language and logic of
segregationism. Ironically, however, the racialization of a discourse of con-
sumption made it diﬃcult to sell temperance to a white electorate. The
spectre of the degeneration of poor whites through drink became less convinc-
ing in light of the burgeoning consumer tastes of an ascendant Afrikaner
middle class. Moreover, while the national and provincial leadership of the
WCTU continued to reproduce itself, it struggled to hold onto a younger
generation of activists. An internal history suggests that the low conversion
rate from the youth unions (the ‘Ys’) to full membership after the war was
decisive. Temperance ceased to hold much appeal for younger whites
seduced by the consumer boom of the s – although the Coloured wing
of the WCTU may have fared a little better. In , the chairman of the
Cape WCTU, M. E. Duguid, alluded to eﬀorts to resuscitate moribund
unions and to revive relations with SATA. She also hinted at some internal
carping:
Some of us rather enjoy living in the past – getting ‘a kick’ out of recalling its past
glories or moaning over its failures. Have we not all heard about the ‘W.C.T.U.
being on its last legs’? Do we listen? Do we believe it? Do we contradict it?
 This is told through the debate over the imported American Saddleback in Swart,
‘High horses’.
 The Women’s Christian Temperance Union in South Africa – (Cape Town,
undated), .
 The war years had witnessed pressure on wages as well as consumer
shortages. N. Nattrass, ‘Economic growth and transformation in the s’, in
S. Dubow and A. Jeeves (eds.), South Africa’s s: Worlds of Possiblities (Cape Town,
), –, .
 ‘Chairman’s Address at Cape Province Convention by Mrs M. E. Duguid’, White
Ribbon, :, (Nov/Dec ).
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In particular, she referred to the diﬃculties associated with preaching the
doctrine of abstinence to youth who were seduced by the glamour of liquor
advertising, singling out the current Miss South Africa as someone who
frequented all too many drinks receptions. This was a cultural shift
from which the temperance international suﬀered more generally in the
s, but amongst the Afrikaner population the changes were especially
striking.
By contrast, the KWV grew in stature during the s. Having secured
powers to regulate pricing and production across the wine industry in ,
the KWV pursued a dual strategy of boosting exports and encouraging
farmers to embrace the shift to drinking wine. In , the KWV ﬁnally
introduced a quota system that limited how much each farm was permitted to
produce. This helped to reduce the surplus and ushered in a period of
prosperity. The enhanced credibility of the KWV mattered because the
implication of its strategy was that there needed to be an expanded internal
market for natural wine. The KWV now took up the argument about the
health beneﬁts of wine, which had been articulated by Leipoldt, and made it a
central plank of its public information campaign. By making a strong case
for the fusion of wine and food, the KWV hoped to cut the ground from
beneath the temperance discourse on health.
A signiﬁcant breakthrough came with the adoption of cool fermentation in
the late s, making it possible to produce white wines that were both
aromatic and consistent in quality. This innovation was actively encouraged
by the ﬁrms who closely supervized every stage of the production process on
the farms. The greater costs involved encouraged smaller producers to join a
resurgent cooperative movement that could draw on credit from the Afrikaner
banks to invest in state-of-the-art cellars. The cooperatives sold much of their
wine to companies like the Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery (SFW) that, in
turn, pioneered strong brands. The SFW enjoyed the greatest success with
Lieberstein, which became the world’s largest selling brand in the early
s, building on an image of youthful sociability. While the triangle
between the KWV, the cooperatives, and the merchant-manufacturers was
never devoid of tension, all three now shared an interest in promoting the
domestic market for natural wine.
After , the KWV leadership nurtured a special relationship with the
NP. Successive chairmen were members of the Broederbond, and several
directors held parliamentary seats. Crucially, the KWV was also able to
fashion ways of tapping into public displays of Afrikaner nationalism that
 The pages of Die Wynboer in the s and s regularly promoted wine through
glamour, featuring successive Miss South Africas alongside fashion models. The WCTU
fought back with its own advertising campaign, including an iconic poster that read ‘You
May Think Alcohol Puts Springs Under You But It Always Lets you Down’, Women’s
Christian, .
 P. Pennock, ‘“The number one social problem of our time”: American Protestants
and temperance politics in the s’, Journal of Church and State, :  (), .
 Van Zyl, KWV, –.
 W.C. Winshaw founded SFW in , but the company was relaunched in .
 In the s, André J. Du Toit, was a member of the Broederbond, as was Avril
Malan.
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were a feature of the postwar years. The KWV took full advantage in 
of the tercentenary of the arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck, promoting a National
Vine Festival to commemorate his ﬁrst planting of vines. That year, the
KWV also took a vine-leaf out of the Burgundian book and instigated annual
festivals in the main towns in the winelands, which celebrated both Dutch
heritage and the speciﬁc Huguenot contribution to viniculture. These
events typically included processions of ﬂoats – depicting giant bunches of
grapes, vats, and period dress – led by drum majorettes. The dignitaries who
were invited to speak at the exhibition grounds typically included local NP
politicians, ministers, and KWV directors. The temperance movement had
nothing to match this reappropriation of Afrikaner cultural politics in the
service of wine, compounding their failure to make sense of an emergent
youth culture. Although the DRC remained a signiﬁcant ally, the temperance
movement continued to appear as a predominantly English-speaking and
Coloured aﬀair.
In the late s, the proliferation of shebeens was a feature not just of the
Transvaal, where they became a badge of African urban chic, but also of the
Western Cape. In , the Malan Commission was mandated ‘to inquire
into and report on the general distribution of liquor and the selling prices
thereof’. The most controversial question was whether ‘non-whites’ should
be permitted access to ‘European liquor’ given an ‘illicit liquor trade which
transcends the wildest ﬂights of the imagination’. The commission
reasoned that extending prohibition would only be eﬀective if the ban on
alcohol was extended to whites, which it considered impractical.The status
quo was not acceptable either, which left the option of reform. The com-
mission concluded that the objective should be to encourage all groups
to embrace the consumption of natural wine and malt beer alongside the
intake of food. It suggested that light wine and beer be made available
through municipal beerhalls in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, but that
oﬀ-site consumption remain subject to a simpliﬁed version of the permit
system. In the Cape and Natal, it recommended that existing ‘privileges’
be maintained, although it proposed that the hours of sale for Europeans and
non-whites be harmonized. When it came to whites, the commission
found that the consumption of spirits was considerably higher than for
‘comparable’ countries in Europe and Australasia. It reasoned that the
strategic objective should be one of shifting consumption away from ‘strong
drink’. The proposal that special licences be introduced for the sale of
 L. Witz, Apartheid’s Festival: Contesting South Africa’s National Pasts
(Bloomington, ).  Van Zyl, KWV, –.
 The Burgundy festivals were a response to the crisis of the s. P. Whalen,
‘“Insofar as the ruby wine seduces them”: cultural strategies for selling wine in inter-war
Burgundy’, Contemporary European History, : (), –. The Cape festivals were
so similar that it is diﬃcult to believe that they were not a direct copy.
 This commission was chaired by Avril Malan, a former academic and MP. Report of
the Commission of Enquiry on the General Distribution and Selling Prices of Liquor, May
 [Malan Commission], unoﬃcial translation by the Western Province Bottle Store
Keepers Association, .  Ibid. .  Ibid. .
 Contrary to temperance claims, it considered that: ‘There is little proof that the
consumption of natural types of drink alone can create alcoholics.’ Ibid. .
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natural wines and beers in restaurants, cafés, and hotels was especially
controversial because it threatened to reverse one of the victories claimed
by the temperance movement in . But the commission went even
further and argued that because healthy drinking was to be linked to the
consumption of food, it should logically be available for purchase in grocery
stores.
Remarkably, the government did not merely accept the diagnosis, but
jettisoned gradualism altogether. Despite stiﬀ opposition from many MPs,
parliament approved an amendment in  (eﬀective in August ), which
made all kinds of alcohol legally available to all races. This was a victory for
the KWV and the liquor ﬁrms, who immediately embarked on advertising
campaigns and promotions designed to bring wine and beer to the conscious-
ness (and lips) of the African consumer. A further amendment in /
relaxed controls over distribution, making it possible to purchase wine
through grocery stores and supermarkets. Vorster insisted that he was not
acting under pressure from the wine farmers, although he went on to state that
he would be happy enough if they beneﬁted. He also praised the KWV for
having assumed an advocacy role for the industry that went beyond its strict
remit. Such a bold endorsement would have been inconceivable before the
s, and underlined the extent to which the temperance movement had lost
ground.
Vorster reinforced the contention that the most sensible course of action
was to promote a healthier drinking pattern through the integration of natural
wine into the habits of everyday life. This had become a perpetual refrain in
the speeches of the KWV chairman, Dr André du Toit. In , Du Toit had
used the editorial page of Die Wynboer to criticize legislation that retarded the
development of a wine culture:
We speak so easily and so often about the upholding of Western civilisation . . . As I
have learned to know such civilisation in Western countries, a general and healthy
use of wine assumes an integral place in the lifestyle of Western people. In their
hotels, in their cafés, in their restaurants and also in their homes wine assumes its
rightful place as a foodstuﬀ.
Ironically, this invocation of a virtuous European drinking model came at
precisely the juncture when it was under attack in France. But for all the
heat generated, there was to be no reprise of –. Although Vorster
 Ibid. .
 This was achieved with remarkable speed in the case of beer, but wine sales
increased only slowly. Mager, Beer.
 Minister of Justice, John Vorster, introducing second reading of the Liquor Laws
Amendment Act, in Unie Van Suid-Afrika, Debatte van die Volksraad (Pretoria),  June
, column .
 Vorster noted that the KWV was not permitted to sell wine inside South Africa
under the ‘gentleman’s agreement’.
 ‘Algemene gesindheid teenoor wyn is nie reg nie’, Die Wynboer, Mar. , .
 Bowker (MP for Albany), Debatte,  June , column . The French wine
industry under pressure from a campaign against alcoholism that denied the speciﬁc
virtues of wine. M. Demossier, Wine Drinking Culture in France: A National Myth or a
Modern Passion? (Cardiﬀ, ), .
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insisted that MPs were free to vote with their consciences, he secured passage
of the act with relatively minor concessions.
CONC LU S I O N
This article has focused on pressure for legislation, the reason being that both
the temperance movement and wine interests depended on it: the ﬁrst to curb
access to liquor and the second to resolve the problems of collective action
amongst farmers and merchants. At the same time, of course, their interests
were diametrically opposed. Whereas conﬂicting interests within the wine
industry created obstacles, the temperance movement derived strength from
its decentralized structure. In the decades before , the WCTU, IOGT/
IOTT, and SATA converted temperance into a popular cause, at the same
time as they pioneered mass action and perfected the art of political lobbying.
The wine farmers borrowed some of these tactics, but after  the relatively
few MPs representing wine-farming constituencies had little inﬂuence.
Weakly organized and at odds with the merchants, the wine farmers were in
no position to press for revisions to the liquor laws that they desperately
needed.
Between  and , successive governments endeavoured to steer a
course between wine and temperance. In , Smuts was prepared to
devolve some regulatory powers upon the KWV to resolve the problems of
collective action, but had no desire to antagonize temperance campaigners.
The struggle to shape the Liquor Act of  underlined the superior
organizational capacity of WCTU/SATA. It also revealed the willingness of
the temperance movement to sacriﬁce African political rights in the process,
given the presumed link between liquor and the franchise. In the s, a
point of equilibrium was reached. However, the Wine Commission and two
enquiries into Coloured aﬀairs raised signiﬁcant doubts about the viability of
racially exclusive legislation. In the period after , the KWV emerged as a
powerful voice for the wine industry with close links to the ruling party.
Moreover, while the social campaigning of the WCTU now seemed
outmoded, the KWV skilfully exploited Afrikaner cultural nationalism, an
emergent youth culture, and the consolidation of an Afrikaner middle class.
The KWV repositioned wine as a respectable and wholesome commodity,
while the ﬁrms used the association with food to present wine-drinking as a
social lubricant and as appropriate for men as for women. The increase in
consumption from , hectolitres in  to , in  (while
brandy sales remained static) signalled a qualitative shift in white consump-
tion patterns. The KWV subsequently lobbied successfully for the
deracialization of the liquor laws, and in tandem with the manufacturers set
out to create a nation of wine-drinkers.
The temperance movement always derived its strength from being a
network that was simultaneously global and local. By contrast, the crisis of
overproduction forced the wine industry into an acute localism. The
 The most signiﬁcant was that grocers’ licences would only be granted in magisterial
districts where the sale of natural wine represented less than  per cent of sales. Vorster,
Debatte,  June , column .
 Van Zyl, KWV, .
 PAUL NUGENT
transformation of its fortunes came at the point when the KWV was able to
secure a strategic position within the Afrikaner nationalist front, while
tapping into a discourse of consumption that was international by prove-
nance. The supreme irony is that the advocacy of a European model, which
was considered applicable to all racial groups, came just as the apartheid
regime was insisting on innate diﬀerences between racial groups and recon-
ciling itself to international isolation in the aftermath of Sharpeville.
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